Fighter Jet Helmet Biography
In 2006, the GAO warned that excessive concurrency between the production of additional F-35 aircraft and testing of their design might result in expensive refits for several hundred aircraft planned to be produced before completion of tests.[37] In November 2010, the GAO found that "Managing an extensive, still-maturing global network of suppliers adds another layer of complexity to producing aircraft efficiently and on-time" and that "due to the extensive amount of testing still to be completed, the program could be required to make alterations to its production processes, changes to its supplier base, and costly retrofits to produced and fielded aircraft, if problems are discovered."[38] The United States Air Force (USAF) budget data in 2010, along with other sources, projects the F-35 to have a flyaway cost from US$89 million to US$200 million over the planned production of F-35s.[39][40][41] In February 2011, the Pentagon put a price of $207.6 million for each of the 32 aircraft to be acquired in FY2012, rising to $304.15 million ($9,732.8/32) if its share of RDT&E spending is included.[42][43]
In 2011, program head Vice Adm. David Venlet confirmed that the concurrency built into the program "was a miscalculation".[44] This was during a contract dispute where the Pentagon insisted that Lockheed Martin help cover the costs of applying fixes found during testing to aircraft already produced.[45] Lockheed Martin objected that the cost sharing posed an uninsurable unbounded risk that the company could not cover, and later responded that the "concurrency costs for F-35 continue to reduce".[46][47] However, the Senate Armed Services Committee strongly backed the Pentagon position.[48] In December 2011, Lockheed Martin agreed to a cost sharing agreement.[49] The Aerospace Industries Association trade group warned that such changes would force them to change their behavior and anticipate cost overruns in their future contract bids.[50] As of 2012, problems found in flight testing are expected to continue to lead to elevated levels of engineering changes (to be made to newly produced aircraft and retrofitted onto previously produced aircraft) through 2019.[51] The total additional cost for concurrency in the program is around $1.3 billion.[52]
In 2012, General Norton A. Schwartz decried the "foolishness" of reliance on computer models to settle the final design of the aircraft before flight testing found the issues that needed redesign.[53] In 2013, JSF project team leader USAF Lieutenant General Chris Bogdan said that "A large amount of concurrency, that is, beginning production long before your design is stable and long before you've found problems in test, creates downstream issues where now you have to go back and retrofit airplanes and make sure the production line has those fixes in them. And that drives complexity and cost".[54]
In 2006, the GAO warned that excessive concurrency between the production of additional F-35 aircraft and testing of their design might result in expensive refits for several hundred aircraft planned to be produced before completion of tests.[37] In November 2010, the GAO found that "Managing an extensive, still-maturing global network of suppliers adds another layer of complexity to producing aircraft efficiently and on-time" and that "due to the extensive amount of testing still to be completed, the program could be required to make alterations to its production processes, changes to its supplier base, and costly retrofits to produced and fielded aircraft, if problems are discovered."[38] The United States Air Force (USAF) budget data in 2010, along with other sources, projects the F-35 to have a flyaway cost from US$89 million to US$200 million over the planned production of F-35s.[39][40][41] In February 2011, the Pentagon put a price of $207.6 million for each of the 32 aircraft to be acquired in FY2012, rising to $304.15 million ($9,732.8/32) if its share of RDT&E spending is included.[42][43]
In 2011, program head Vice Adm. David Venlet confirmed that the concurrency built into the program "was a miscalculation".[44] This was during a contract dispute where the Pentagon insisted that Lockheed Martin help cover the costs of applying fixes found during testing to aircraft already produced.[45] Lockheed Martin objected that the cost sharing posed an uninsurable unbounded risk that the company could not cover, and later responded that the "concurrency costs for F-35 continue to reduce".[46][47] However, the Senate Armed Services Committee strongly backed the Pentagon position.[48] In December 2011, Lockheed Martin agreed to a cost sharing agreement.[49] The Aerospace Industries Association trade group warned that such changes would force them to change their behavior and anticipate cost overruns in their future contract bids.[50] As of 2012, problems found in flight testing are expected to continue to lead to elevated levels of engineering changes (to be made to newly produced aircraft and retrofitted onto previously produced aircraft) through 2019.[51] The total additional cost for concurrency in the program is around $1.3 billion.[52]
In 2012, General Norton A. Schwartz decried the "foolishness" of reliance on computer models to settle the final design of the aircraft before flight testing found the issues that needed redesign.[53] In 2013, JSF project team leader USAF Lieutenant General Chris Bogdan said that "A large amount of concurrency, that is, beginning production long before your design is stable and long before you've found problems in test, creates downstream issues where now you have to go back and retrofit airplanes and make sure the production line has those fixes in them. And that drives complexity and cost".[54]
Fighter Jet Helmet
Fighter Jet Helmet
Fighter Jet Helmet
Fighter Jet Helmet
Fighter Jet Helmet
Fighter Jet Helmet
Fighter Jet Helmet
Fighter Jet Helmet
Fighter Jet Helmet
Fighter Jet Helmet
Fighter Jet Helmet
Fighter Jet Helmet
Fighter Jet Helmet
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